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Abstract— Quantum computers will change the 
cryptographic panorama. A technology once believed 
to lay far away into the future is increasingly closer to 
real world applications. Quantum computers will 
break the algorithms used in our public key 
infrastructure and in our key exchange protocols, 
forcing a complete retooling of the cryptography as we 
know it. Quantum Key distribution is a physical layer 
technology immune to quantum or classical 
computational threats. However, it requires a physical 
substrate, and optical fiber has been the usual choice. 
Most of the time used just as a point to point link for 
the exclusive transport of the delicate quantum 
signals. Its integration in a real-world shared network 
has not been attempted so far. Here we show how the 
new programmable software network architectures, 
together with specially designed quantum systems can 
be used to produce a network that integrates classical 
and quantum communications, including 
management, in a single, production-level 
infrastructure. The network can also incorporate new 
quantum-safe algorithms and use the existing security 
protocols, thus bridging the gap between today’s 
network security and the quantum-safe network of the 
future. This can be done in an evolutionary way, 
without zero-day migrations and the corresponding 
upfront costs. We also present how the technologies 
have been deployed in practice using a production 
network.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Security has always been a concern when speaking about 
critical information and infrastructures. Vulnerabilities can 
compromise entire networks at all levels, causing not only large 
economical losses and breaches of personal rights or loss of 
critical information, but also damage the public image and 
erode the confidence of users. The advent of quantum 
technologies, more particularly quantum computing, has 
brought new security threats which affect most of the existing 
security protocols. These protocols rely on mathematical 
problems that are computationally complex using traditional 
computers. However, quantum computing has demonstrated to 
be capable of breaking some of the most used. The 
 
 
mathematical basis of algorithms like RSA and ECC are weak 
under quantum attacks and so are other common protocols that 
use them, like Diffie-Hellman. The advancements of quantum 
technologies are bringing quantum computers closer in time. 
Devices once believed to be several decades in the future are 
now forecasted to happen within the next five years [1]. Albeit 
predictions are always risky, the trend is clear. Since the 
information can be recorded now to be deciphered later, any 
communication that is required to remain secret for a few years 
is potentially in danger today if it is protected only with these 
algorithms. This situation forced institutions such as the US 
National Security Agency to deprecate the current public key 
algorithms used in their communications, and start substituting 
them with quantum-safe methodologies as early as 2015. Other 
organizations, in particular the ones related to standardization, 
like the NIST, ETSI, IEEE, IETF, ISO/IEC and ITU-T followed 
suit [2]. Since changing the security infrastructure would 
require years, it is of fundamental importance to start thinking 
about a future-proof security infrastructure today.  
There are two avenues to create this quantum-safe 
infrastructure. One is to substitute the current algorithms for 
others that could resist the attacks of a quantum computer and 
the other is to use quantum cryptography. The former relies on 
algorithmic complexity, while the latter is a physical layer 
technology immune to any computational threat. The 
standardization of both have already started [3,4] but it will take 
time, first to agree the standards themselves, and then to 
implement them at a global scale. In the case of post-quantum 
algorithms and according to NIST, the time frame would easily 
be well within the predicted danger zone. It is thus important to 
speed the adoption of quantum-safe technologies, especially in 
critical infrastructures. 
Quantum cryptography [5] most prominent and mature result 
is Quantum Key Distribution [6]. The QKD technology can be 
described as a way to provide two synchronized sources of 
random bits, separated in space and with the property that the 
information about the bits leaked outside of the pair can be 
limited as much as desired. This allows to create a secret 
symmetric key between the pair. While post-quantum 
algorithms, still a matter subject to intense research, will be 
always dependent on the computational power ascribed to the 
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adversary, QKD can be mathematically proven to be secure, 
independently of the resources of the adversary: It is an 
information theoretic secure -ITS- primitive [7]. Also, QKD 
keys are not correlated in any way among them, thus 
guaranteeing forward and backward security.  
However, the physical layer restrictions and the point-to-
point nature of QKD has lead this technology to be 
implemented in ad-hoc and restricted (usually point-to-point) 
scenarios. Even the most advanced demonstrators show QKD 
networks (trusted-relay-based) not integrated in network 
management systems, leading to non-optimal implementations. 
This actually amounts to impose the building of separate ad-hoc 
networks for QKD purposes. This is extremely expensive and 
cumbersome, explaining why QKD technologies, and therefore 
QKD networks, are far from being broadly adopted in network 
infrastructures. 
The use of Telco networks is the only way to push forward 
QKD technologies for communication services. First 
applications will be deployed for corporate environments, 
which show more security related concerns. This should enable 
economies of scale that will eventually lead to generalize these 
solutions on residential services.  
The integration of software defined networking (SDN) 
technologies, through the development of standard protocols 
and interfaces, has allowed new services and systems to be 
seamlessly integrated in telecommunications networks. It 
allows to manage and optimize the entire infrastructure from a 
central platform, the SDN controller. The flexibility brought by 
SDN reduces drastically the effort of integrating new devices 
and technologies in the network. In particular, the success of 
QKD networks radically depends on the degree in which they 
can be adopted in the existing infrastructure. The flexibility of 
the Software Defined Networks (SDN) allows the integration 
of quantum communications in the telecommunications 
network to a degree that was simply impossible in previous 
schemes, where network devices should be modified, one by 
one, to create a quantum channel. 
The objective of this work is to demonstrate, for the first 
time, a network that can seamlessly integrate, in a logical and 
physical way, quantum and classical communications in a 
production level telecommunications infrastructure. The 
scheme is also compatible with existing security protocols as 
well as post-quantum ones, allowing for an evolutionary path to 
quantum-safe infrastructures. 
This work is organized as follows: Section II presents the  
QKD characteristics and network approaches used until now; 
Section III proposes a high-level abstraction model for 
software-defined QKD nodes; Section IV describes the testbed 
network used for the implementation, while Section V presents 
the conclusions. 
II.  QKD TECHNOLOGY AND NETWORKS 
QKD is a physical technology.  It allows the growing of a 
secret key that is shared only by the legitimate users of a 
quantum channel connecting them. This channel is usually 
implemented using optical fiber as a transport media for the 
quantum signals (qubits). Thus, QKD can be seen as a 
technology to extend the security perimeter to the optical fiber 
used to link them. To perform QKD, a public and authenticated 
classical channel is  needed in addition to the quantum channel, 
in particular for post-processing operations, such as key 
distillation and privacy amplification. During the installation 
process of a new QKD device, an initial secret is assumed to be 
shared among both ends -customarily named Alice for the 
emitter and Bob for the receiver- for the first authentication. 
Further authentication rounds between Alice and Bob (not just 
in a direct link, but also in a multi-hop QKD link) are done using 
the freshly generated key material. Assuming a correct 
implementation, installation and no side channels, QKD can be 
demonstrated to be absolutely secure. This means that the 
information on the secret key leaked outside the 
emitter/receiver pair can be made arbitrarily small. Unlike 
conventional algorithms, QKD is not based on computational 
assumptions, like the complexity of certain mathematical 
problems, but on the laws of Physics. This makes it resistant to 
any computational advance, like quantum computing. 
However, this physical nature makes QKD intrinsically 
distance-limited, as qubits have a finite probability to interact 
with the transport medium. A signal propagating in a medium 
suffers an exponential attenuation and this is critical when they 
are a single quantum. Also, the interactions with the 
environment are indistinguishable from the action of a spy and 
errors must be treated as if they were the action of an 
eavesdropper. This heavily penalizes the secret key throughput. 
As a typical example, in the case of qubits implemented in 
photons and using optical fiber, losses are about 0.2 dB per Km 
when using the telecommunications C-band at 1550 nm. QKD 
systems working with losses of about 30 dB producing a 
significant key rate have been demonstrated, and technology is 
reaching maturity quickly. This means that today’s practical 
limit in distance is about 150 Km just considering the fiber 
attenuation. Going beyond means a strongly reduced secret key 
rate output. Top performance figures are about 1Mbps of final 
secret key at 40 Km distance in direct links, without crossing 
any passive network equipment that would increase losses and 
penalize the throughput. This distance limits could be 
eventually overcome by using quantum repeaters, which would 
also allow other uses, but this is a technology still years in the 
future [8]. 
As a consequence, the current security model of a QKD 
network is that of a collection of interconnected trusted nodes, 
a structure that fits well with modern optical infrastructures, 
where QKD can be used to connect the security perimeters 
protecting the network points of presence where the control 
plane instances are running. For network operators, inter 
datacenter as well as last mile deployments to business 
customers are the scenarios where QKD would apply. In this 
sense, QKD is a realistic technology to build a physical security 
layer to protect the infrastructure [9] and network services 
[10,11]. The importance of the testbed used in this 
communication lies in that it demonstrates how QKD can be 
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implemented in a real-world network, installed in a production 
facility and run in a fully integrated manner, where the quantum 
and classical parts are managed consistently. This allows the 
incremental installation of QKD and QKD-related services, 
avoiding the use of a separate network for the quantum channels 
and the large up-front costs associated, as has been done in the 
past. Moreover, the testbed has been used to show industrially 
relevant use cases [9,11] for service and infrastructure security.  
QKD links generate key material at the two endpoints of the 
quantum channel (Alice and Bob), but different strategies have 
been designed to enable key delivery among multiple points 
connected via quantum links. For longer distances than the ones 
supported by a single link, the key material is distributed using 
secured and trusted intermediate nodes, all connected by QKD 
links composing a network. In order to securely forward the 
keys, each hop/link must provide ITS encryption and 
authentication. 
This approach has been demonstrated to be compatible with 
metropolitan area networks, either running exclusive quantum 
networks, in parallel with operator’s infrastructures, notably the 
pioneering DARPA network [12], or to explore the capability 
to run in coexistence with classical communications [13]. More 
specifically, the last ones focus on direct switched connections 
using as much off-the-shelf optical components as possible. 
Moreover, when speaking about QKD network management, 
the most mature developments come from the SECOQC and 
Tokyo projects [14,15], both essentially with the same 
structure. In SECOQC they developed a logical layer to enable 
key delivery and secure channels among trusted locations 
within the QKD network. This key distribution management 
layer was implemented following traditional networking 
principles. A point-to-point protocol provided a mechanism to 
make any QKD network location aware of the state of the 
quantum network (e.g. QKD network nodes and their 
connectivity, key availability per link), similar to other existing 
routing protocols, like the open shortest path first -OSPF-. In 
this way, each node was responsible for accepting or denying 
new requests, as well as to decide which path is the appropriate 
to instantiate new multi-hop connections. This might lead to 
non-optimal strategies and a misuse of the key material. Such 
optimization and synchronization issues can be mitigated when 
centralizing the network planning. The SDN control plane 
could not only dynamically plan the creation of multi-hop QKD 
key delivery across a network, but also automate the physical 
link creation and the installation process when adding new 
QKD systems. Crucially, it can also manage the coexistence of 
quantum and classical channels sharing the same network. This 
work introduces new directions for the integration of QKD 
resources into novel networking architectures, in the form of 
new abstraction models, architectures and use cases. 
 
Figure 1: Definition of a Software Defined QKD Node. One or many 
QKD systems work under the control of a SDN agent that is in charge 
of communicating with a central SDN controller. The products of the 
QKD systems (keys) are managed with the help of an entity referred 
as the Local Key Management System (LKMS, see text.). 
III. ABSTRACTION MODEL FOR SOFTWARE-DEFINED 
QKD NODES 
The main idea behind the proposed scheme is to model any 
type of QKD system as similarly as possible to any other 
network elements (e.g. router, switch) so a SDN controller will 
be capable of understanding, integrating and optimizing their 
behavior. Creating such model requires an analysis of which 
capabilities and parameters from the QKD domain are useful 
from the network management perspective. For instance, QKD 
systems are highly complex, have multiple operational 
hardware and software subsystems whose complexity should be 
hidden from the network controller. Also, other data produced 
and maintained by the QKD systems, such as internal 
information or the actual key material, must be kept 
confidential, as they are not required for network operation and 
their exposure could compromise the security of the QKD 
network. 
This model serves different purposes: firstly, moving 
towards standard interfaces will allow to reduce the time-to-
market of a solution whose major hard-stopper is being stuck to 
point-to-point ad-hoc implementations; secondly, the advent of 
SDN technologies for optical networks facilitates the spectrum 
allocation for the quantum channel; and finally, the 
centralization of the QKD network management will allow to 
better optimize generation and utilization of QKD-derived 
keys, while maintaining a central database of active links and 
consumer applications. 
Our proposal is then to aggregate and abstract any QKD 
system within the same secure area as interfaces of a logical 
network element. Let us describe the node architecture depicted 
in Figure 1: we consider the whole set of elements as part of our 
Software-Defined QKD (SDQKD) node. Down at the right 
bottom of the Figure 1, we can see several QKD systems under 
the same location and logical control. These physical systems 
are in charge of creating quantum channels and generating 
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QKD-derived keys, which are then stored at the local key 
management system (LKMS). The LKMS maintains the keys 
generated from the different QKD systems and gathered via a 
key extraction/delivery interface using an interface 
specification from the ETSI ISG-QKD group. 
 Finally, the SDN agent is capable of gathering important 
data from the node, communicating with the SDN controller 
and handling and activating the configuration updates requested 
by the controller. These operations will require the agent to 
orchestrate the other elements within the node: the LKMS and 
the QKD systems. 
 
Figure 2: Physical and logical view of a SDN QKD network. A layer 
that contains the physically available network is used to create the 
functional QKD network. Note the virtual link that connects SDQKD 
nodes B and D through a multi-hop connection that passes through 
SDQKD node C. 
 
In our design, the SDQKD node model is structured in four 
key components: 
• Interfaces: all the QKD systems aggregated under a 
SDQKD node.  
• Applications: any entity, either external or internal, 
using keys from the node’s LKMS. 
• Links: considered as “key” associations between two 
SDQKDNs, either physically connected via a quantum 
channel, or based on trusted-relay –virtual– schemes. 
• Capabilities and additional information: additional data, 
such as identifiers and locations, and support for 
multiple operations. 
This abstraction model is on a definition phase within the 
ETSI industry specification group (ISG) for QKD. While 
exploring every single parameter of the model is out of the 
scope of this work, describing the use cases supported by the 
SDQKD paradigm and model while looking at Figure 2 will 
provide a better overview of the solution. Some of the 
fundamental use cases which are the base for our SDQKD 
network are: 
• Creation of physical QKD link: a physical QKD link is, 
in other words, a pair of QKD systems connected via a 
quantum channel capable of generating keys (in Figure 
2, the link between A and B). A quantum channel is 
carried by a point-to-point optical connection with no 
intermediate active components or regeneration. This 
process can be automated by the controller to optimize 
the spectrum allocation and to monitor the performance 
of the link. 
• Creation of a virtual QKD link: a virtual link is an 
association between two SDQKD nodes which 
generates keys through intermediate trusted nodes 
forwarding key material using ITS procedures, also 
known as trusted-relay mode. To keep the same security 
level, OTP is used for the key relay. In Figure 2, the link 
between B and D, via trusted-node C. 
• Application management: The SDN controller, via 
notifications and other monitoring messages, is 
responsible for detecting and managing client 
applications. In this way, applications do not need to be 
aware of the QKD network, but just of their respective 
endpoints for requesting key material. This also allows 
to keep a central repository of applications and to 
monitor their key usage for accounting purposes. 
These three base operations form the core for more complex 
management and use cases (e.g. to create multicast associations 
for securing sessions shared between multiple parties) and are 
the primary focus of the Madrid’s SDQKD network 
demonstrator, presented in the next section. 
 
 
Figure 3: Map of the Madrid SDQKD network and logical 
representation of the elements involved in the field trial. Three 
Telefonica’s production facilities are connected in a ring. 
IV. TESTBED 
To show the technological maturity of these concepts, we 
have implemented a first-of-a-kind SDQKD network in 
Madrid. The uniqueness of this network is based on several 
reasons: 
• Field-trial on a production network: It is the first 
demonstrator using a commercial production network. The 
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fibers connect production points of presence (PoPs) of 
Telefonica Spain’s metro network in Madrid. No difference was 
made in the procedures of the installation of the standard 
telecommunications equipment and the QKD devices, 
highlighting their stability and robustness. 
• Continuous variable QKD (CV-QKD): The QKD technology 
used in the trial is CV-QKD, which is known to be more 
resilient to noise. The equipment, developed by the Huawei 
Quantum Communications Laboratory in Huawei Research 
Germany, has been designed considering the SDN principle, as 
software driven and programmable systems. Although the 
network is implemented using this technology, the SDQKDN 
model definition is designed to cope with any existing QKD 
technology and vendor system. 
• Quantum channel co-propagation: The quantum channel is 
co-propagated with commercial classical communications. The 
quantum channel is capable of tolerating more than 20 classical 
channels at 100Gbps in the same C band than the quantum 
channel. The testbed uses commercial optical transport network 
(OTN) platforms. The quantum channel is injected in the 
network using these same devices, without requiring any non-
standard equipment. 
• SDN managing the QKD resources: It is the first SDN 
managed QKD network in a production environment. The 
creation of links (physical or virtual) and the management of 
client applications is done via standard protocols and a well-
defined model that includes the necessary parameters to 
manage and optimize the quantum network. 
• QKD securing the control plane: QKD is added in an 
incremental way to the existing security infrastructure: 
whenever composable, keys obtained using QKD and standard 
protocols are XOR-ed, so that the certifications of the existing 
security protocols remain applicable. This means that the QKD 
layer can be seen as a way to seamlessly upgrade the security to 
a quantum-safe grade, without destroying the trust in the current 
classical mechanisms. Note that this is also an easy way to 
incorporate post-quantum algorithms. 
• Additional telecommunications use cases: Furthermore, 
different use cases ([9,11], among others to be published) were 
implemented on top of our SDQKD network to secure multiple 
communication layers among PoPs. 
The testbed connects three Telefonica Spain PoPs with three 
fiber pairs that are part of Telefonica Spain’s production 
network: Almagro (hosting a Telefonica I+D/gCTIO laboratory 
shared with a Telefonica Spain PoP), Norte and Concepcion. 
The fibers go across other elements that are part of the 
commercial network, including patch panels and other 
connectors. They cause losses on the optical channel higher 
than what can be expected from the distance alone. Almagro 
hosts the QKD transmitter, while Norte and Concepcion host 
the two receivers. The QKD network, following SDN 
principles, is optimized in such a way that the single transmitter 
can generate keys with the two receivers having minimum 
(even none) performance penalties, since while the transmitter 
generates keys with one end, the other uses this interval to 
perform its required calibration process. Some general 
parameters of the links:  
• Almagro-Norte: 3.9 Km length and around 6dBs of losses, 
with a key generation rate calculated from the measured signals 
above 70kbps, with coexistence of quantum and classical 
channels. 
• Almagro-Concepcion: 6.4 Km length and around 7 + 4dBs 
of losses (the 4dBs, coming from an additional 20Km fiber 
spool to test longer distances), with a key generation rate above 
20kbps, with coexistence of quantum and classical channels. 
• Norte-Concepcion: 5.5 Km length and 7 dBs of losses, 
carrying just classical channels. This link is used to demonstrate 
a multi-hop/virtual link using SDN and QKD keys. 
Figure 3 depicts the logical and physical maps of the Madrid 
SDQKD network. In the logical schema (Fig. 3, lower part) the 
devices at each location are shown. We can find, apart from 
other devices for measuring and gathering results, three 
 
Figure 4: (left) OTDR measurement between the Almagro and Norte facilities showing the distances and losses. (right) OSA capture of the 
link between Almagro and Norte carrying the quantum and classical communication signals. The large spikes correspond to the classical 
channels (measured at the receiving end. Their power was more than enough to have classical communications without increasing the typical 
BER). The small spike at about 1550 nm corresponds to a pilot tone used to mark the position of the quantum channel. 
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fundamental systems: the classical optical communication 
systems (the abovementioned OTN platforms), the CV-QKD 
systems and the servers which include the management 
software, the signal post-processing and the different use 
cases/experiments carried out during the field trial. Multiple 
interfaces from the server are connected to the OSN to separate 
the different channels (control, for QKD and network, and data) 
and multiplexed together with the quantum channel. Norte and 
Concepción servers where directly connected via dedicated 
fiber, as there was no direct quantum channel between those 
two locations. Regarding the logical systems, both controller 
and agents implements RESTCONF interfaces to communicate 
between each other. They are based on the abstraction logic 
presented above written in YANG, which is extensible and can 
adapt to the specific capabilities of the QKD 
device.  Additionally, the controller hosts a RabbitMQ server 
for notifying changes from the SDQDKN agents, such as new 
applications connecting to the nodes.” 
To show an example of the characteristics of the optical 
channels, Figure 4 displays the OTDR and OSA measurements 
of one of the links (from Almagro to Norte). The OTDR 
measurement shows both directions of the links, as a loopback 
connection was stablished during the installation. 
The losses in this link are around 6 dBs in each direction. The 
big spike at the middle of the graph at about 3.9 km represents 
the loopback connection at Norte, while the other two spikes 
shows other passive components at an intermediate PoP that 
does not belong to the QKD network. 
The OSA capture shows the classical channels coexisting 
with the quantum channel. In the testbed, up to 17 classical 
channels were used (See Fig. 4, right panel), the maximum 
being dictated by the number of available physical ports The 
pilot tone located between the classical channels 11 and 12 
(approx. 1550 nm) is used to locate the quantum channel and 
for synchronization purposes. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES 
As any technology still in the applied research phase, QKD 
has to go through several stages to reach the necessary maturity, 
also for its certification and standardization, before reaching 
market-ready status. Apart from the well-known issues related 
to hardware interoperability issues (common also in traditional 
networks), architectures for any QKD network have to be 
agreed and designed. These designs should fit any 
implementation, either for QKD networks coexisting with 
conventional communications or for separated networks. They 
also should foresee and be suitable for scenarios with dynamic 
quantum channel allocation based on implementation of SDN, 
and fixed (not reconfigurable) schemes. 
The demonstrations reported in this paper presents a clear 
step forward in enabling the integration of QKD systems in 
current network operator infrastructures. We have used SDN 
principles to produce a converged quantum-classical network 
that shares the physical and logical infrastructure among 
quantum and classical channels.  In contrast to the typical 
quantum networks architectures, that use an ad hoc network, 
running in parallel to the conventional for qubit transmission, 
the quantum-enabled SDN architecture proposed and 
demonstrated here unites under the same management the 
quantum and classical communications, enabling network 
optimization to better use all resources. The developed network 
supports the existing security mechanisms and avoids large 
upfront deployment costs by allowing for staged deployment. 
The demonstration in production sites showcases the maturity 
of the technology for real world services. This paves the way 
for a broader uptake of quantum technologies as a solid building 
block for the quantum-safe networks that will be needed in the 
future.  
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Victor López  M.Sc. from Universidad de Alcalá de Henares (2005) 
and Ph.D. from UAM (2009). In 2006 he joined the High-Performance 
Computing and Networking Research Group, UAM, where he 
worked as an assistant professor. In 2011 he joined Telefonica I+D 
as a technology specialist. He has co-authored more than 150 
publications, 4 patents and contributed to IETF and ONF. His 
research interests include IP/optical networks and their 
programmability (SDN, PCEP). He’s editor of the book Elastic 
Optical Networks: "Architectures, Technologies, and Control". 
 
Diego López M.S. from the University of Granada (1985) and  Ph.D. 
dfrom the University of Seville (2001). He joined Telefonica I+D in 
2011 as a senior technology expert where leads the Technology 
Exploration activities within the GCTO Unit. He is focused on 
network virtualization, infrastructural services, network 
management, new network architectures, and network security. He 
participates in the ETSI ISG on NFV, chairing its Technical Steering 
Committee, the ONF, and the IETF WGs on these activities 
 
Momtchil Peev studied mathematics and physics at the University 
of Sofia, Bulgaria. Ph.D. in solid state physics in 1993. From 1993 to 
1995, he was a post-doctoral Lise-Meitner Fellow at the Vienna 
University of Technology and, from 1995 to 1997, a post-doctoral 
ARCS Fellow. Research associate at ARCS (resp. AIT) until 2010, 
when he became senior scientist and a thematic coordinator for QKD. 
Since 2015 he is a senior expert and project leader in the Optical and 
Quantum Communications Laboratory at the Munich Research 
Center of Huawei Technologies Duesseldorf GmbH. M. Peev led the 
development of a QKD network prototype in the European project 
SECOQC (2004-2008), and coordinated the effort of the Huawei 
Munich Group in the SDN-QKD demonstration of Telefonica-UPM-
Huawei in Madrid (2018).  
  
Andreas Poppe studied Telecommunication Engineering at the 
Vienna University of Technology, Austria. He received his Ph.D. 
degree at the Photonics Institute in 2000. He joined the quantum 
cryptography project at the Institute of Experimental Physics (U. 
Vienna), where he designed an entangled QKD-system, included in 
the QKD-network demonstration of the European project SECOQC. 
He was senior scientist at the Optical Quantum Technologies group 
of the Austrian Institute of Technology, where he led the QKD 
systems development team. In 2015 he joined the Optical and 
Quantum Communications Laboratory at the Munich Research 
Center of Huawei Technologies Duesseldorf GmbH as a senior 
expert. 
 
Antonio Pastor Perales is an Industrial Engineer from the Carlos 
III University of Madrid (1999). He joined Telefónica I+D in 1999 
working on the design and deployment of different networks 
worldwide. Since 2006 he has been working as an expert in network 
security in Telefónica. He is currently the expert responsible for 
security research in the network transport area in Telefonica Global 
CTIO Unit. He has participated in many security research programs, 
holding several security certifications and patents. 
 
Jesús Folgueira  MSc in Telecommunications Engineering from 
UPM (1994) and MSc in Telecommunication Economics from UNED 
(2015). He joined Telefónica I+D in 1997. Head of Transport and IP 
Networks within Telefonica Global CTO unit, he leads Network 
Planning, Technology and Innovation. He is focused on Optical, 
Metro & IP Networks, network virtualization (SDN/NFV) and 
advanced switching. His expertise includes Broadband Access, R&D 
Management, and network deployment.  
 
Vicente Martín Ph.D. Physics (1995) from the Universidad 
Autónoma de Madrid. Full Professor at Universidad Politécnica de 
Madrid (UPM). Founding member of the Specialized Group in 
Quantum Information and Computing of the Spanish Royal Society 
of Physics and of the Quantum Industry Specification Group at the 
European Telecommunications Standards Institute. His main 
research interest is in quantum cryptography and its integration  in 
conventional networks. He leads the Research group on Quantum 
Information and Computation Group at UPM and is also director of 
Center for Computational Simulation. 
 
 
